Approximately 16.7% of output in high-income OECD countries is produced informally. Across these countries, the size of the informal economy is positively related to tax rates and negatively related to governance quality. While existing models of the informal economy mostly focus on developing countries, this paper studies the mechanisms behind the informal economy in high-income countries. I build a model economy where agents can become workers or entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs decide how much of their production to declare as formal and to report for tax purposes and how much to keep informal and hidden. Informal economic activity carries a risk of getting caught, taxed, and fined. Simulations show that differences in tax rates alone can only account for approximately 23% of informality across high-income countries while differences in governance quality, the extent to which tax rates are enforced seem to play a more important role. Taking into account both, governance quality and tax rates, the model can account for 72% of informality in high-income countries. I run a policy experiment that raises governance quality in Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal to Finish standards. Informality across these countries is reduced by an average 13 percentage points and in case tax collection costs increase less than five fold, the policy also implies higher tax revenues.
1 Introduction A recent paper by Davis and Henrekson [2005] provides a natural answer to the first question. Across 14 high-income OECD countries the authors find a positive and significant relation between tax rates and the size of the informal economy. Figure 1 .2, which relates tax rates on income and consumption and social security contributions to the size of the informal economy, is a replication of their result. 6 However, despite a positive relation between tax rates and informality, for countries with equally high tax rates, informal economy estimates are strikingly different. In 1995-96, Spain and the Netherlands had similar total tax rates on income and consumption and social security contributions of around 67%. But whereas the Netherlands' informal economy was estimated to amount to 13.7% of GDP, the estimate for Spain was 22.4%. Apart from tax rates additional forces seem to drive informality in high-income countries.
Lack of institutional quality and corruption are possible suspects. Their importance for explaining differences in the size of the informal economy has been highlighted by various empirical studies. Friedman et al [2000] , Chong and Gradstein [2007] , and Johnson et al [1998] all find a positive relation between lack of institutional quality, a large regulatory burden, corruption and the size of the informal economy. The link between institutional quality and informality also holds for high-income countries. Figure 1 .3 shows the negative relation between the size of the informal economy and the commonly used World Bank Governance Indicators on Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption for the sample of 21 high-income OECD countries. The negative relationship also holds for Transparency International [2002] 's anti-corruption index (see Appendix C). While slightly weakened, all these measures of the negative relationship between institutional quality and informality are also robust to the exclusion of the three poorest among the 21 high-income OECD countries: Greece, Portugal, and Spain.
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In contrast to the current paper, the existing literature on the informal economy has almost exclusively looked at developing countries. The International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) [1993] characterizes the informal economy in developing countries as "consisting of units engaged in the production of goods and services with the primary objective of generating employment and income to the persons concerned" (Paragraph 5).
Hence, most models of the informal economy propose mechanisms that link informality to labor-intensive economic activities of low productivity (see e.g. Harris and Todaro [1970] or Rauch [1991] ). In high-income (developed) countries on the other hand, participat- 
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Data: Schneider [2002] and Kaufmann et al [2006] . ing in the informal sector is not primarily driven by a 'survival' motive as highlighted by Gërxhani [2004] who compares studies of the informal economy for developed and developing countries. For Germany, Schneider and Badekow [2006] find that of those working informally 43% have a full-time employment in the formal economy while only 6.5% are unemployed.
8 Hence, while in developing countries a large share of the urban labor force is employed informally under precarious conditions (without legal recognition, protection, social security) and informality implies avoiding contact with any form of government, this is not the case in high-income countries. On the contrary, the existence of welfare states, low start-up costs for firms, and even financial incentives to become an entrepreneur leads individuals to register as unemployed or as entrepreneurs. They hence do not operate completely hidden but only conceal part of their income from the authorities. In this sense, this paper tries to account for the informal economy in high-income 8 Unfortunately, there exists little empirical work on the environment of the informal economy for developed countries. Williams and Windebank [1998] review small-scale studies of the informal economy in high-income countries but do not find any clear patterns on earnings, type of workers, or their motivations.
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countries defining it as fractions of any legal economic activity effectively hidden from the authorities by entrepreneurs across all types of firms and sectors. The model of this paper relates the size of the informal economy (the degree to which economic activity is hidden) to differences in tax rates and governance quality, the extent to which tax rates are enforced.
In the model economy, there is a representative household and a government. The household has a continuum of members who differ in their managerial ability, as in Lucas [1978] . Given their abilities, household members can become workers or entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs decide how much to produce formally and how much of their income from production to disclose to the tax authorities and how much of their production to keep informal and hidden. This is important, as firms simply conceal part of their income and do not operate completely hidden. In the spirit of Allingham and Sandmo [1972] , hiding income from informal economic activities is associated to a probability of getting caught, taxed, and fined. All entrepreneurs have access to the same technology that uses labor, capital, and their managerial ability as inputs. Occupational choices in this economy are characterized by a threshold that defines who becomes a worker and who will be an entrepreneur. In addition, there are optimal choices by each entrepreneur on the extent of his informal production. Both, the threshold of occupational choice as well as optimal choices by entrepreneurs regarding the extent of informality of their operations, crucially depend on tax rates and governance quality, and they jointly determine the size of the informal economy.
A calibrated version of the model quantifies the influence of tax rates and governance quality on informality. Differences in tax rates alone can only account for approximately 23% of informality across high-income countries. Differences in governance quality seem to play a more important role. When combining both, differences in tax rates and governance quality, the model accounts for 72% of informality across high-income countries. I run a policy experiment with Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal attaining the best governance quality observed (Finland's) and show that in this case their average informality drops by approximately 13 percentage points. Furthermore, I find that this policy increases tax revenues if the associated increase in tax collection costs is less than five fold.
Among recent models of the informal economy the ones that are closely related to this paper are Amaral and Quintin [2006] , Antunes and Cavalcanti [2007] , Prado [2007] and Aruoba [2010] .
9 Amaral and Quintin [2006] try to account for characteristics of the labor market in developing countries, where despite free entry to the formal sector informal workers tend to be less educated and are paid less than formal workers. In their model, the informal economy arises from imperfections in the capital market due to a lack of commitment to financial contracts. Antunes and Cavalcanti [2007] use a similar framework where employment tax, entry costs into the formal sector, and access to credit lead to a more capital-intensive production by formal firms. The authors examine the separate and joint influence of regulation costs and enforcement costs of financial contracts on the informal economy for the US and Peru. Given that differences in start-up costs among high-income countries are small, the current paper does not include them into the analysis and focuses on differences in tax rates and their enforcement instead. In this sense I see both papers as complementary for the study of the informal economy across different groups of countries. Closest to the current paper is Prado [2007] who builds a model of monopolistic competition where firms can decide to operate formally by paying taxes and an entry cost, or to operate informally paying an enforcement cost. The author quantifies the influence of government policy, consisting of tax rates, entry costs to the formal sector, and levels of enforcements on the informal economy by backing out unobserved levels of enforcement for 29 countries, including less developed countries like Mexico and Brazil. However, in his work firms are either formal or informal, and thus cannot decide about the extent of informality, something that this paper considers crucial for the study of the informal economy in high-income countries. In a recent paper by Aruoba [2010] households do decide about the extent of informality by either participating in the formal (day) or informal (night) market. The author relates informality, inflation, taxes, measured output, and governance in a framework where tax policy and inflation rates are being set endogenously by a benevolent planner. I view his results as complementary to mine as they particularly highlight the relation between inflation and informality.
To the best of my knowledge the current paper is the first one to provide a model for the informal economy in high-income countries.
10 Providing such a model may be important for three reasons. To start with, the informal economy in high-income countries is different from the informal economy in developing countries described as an environment where low skilled individuals, unable to enter formal employment engage in low-productive activities. In high-income countries on the other hand, unemployment insurance and incentives for entrepreneurs lead individuals to do not operate completely hidden but only conceal a fraction of their income from the authorities. Secondly, whereas the costs of establishing a formal business seem to play an important role for developing countries, no robust relation between the "Ease-of-Starting-Business-Index" (Djankov et al. [2002] ) and informality can be established for high-income countries.
11 When controlling for income, La Porta and Shleifer [2008] find that an initially positive and significant relationship between the size of the informal economy and start up costs (number of procedures to register a firm) becomes insignificant.
12 Therefore, a focus on the fixed costs for establishing a formal business does not seem to be adequate for the study of the informal economy in high-income countries. Instead, an emphasis on the role of tax rates and quality of governance, as in this paper, seems more appropriate for the proposed analysis, because across high-income countries tax rates are clearly positively related to the size of the informal economy. For a broader group of countries, however, there is no consensus about the relation between taxes and the informal economy. For instance Johnson et al [1998] establish a positive relation between high taxes and informality for 49 countries, whereas Friedman et al [2000] find a negative relation when looking at 69 countries. The authors argue that the latter can be explained by the fact that higher taxes are related to better functioning public administrations and hence to less informal economy. Given that among high-income countries differences in the quality of public administrations are smaller might explain why for the sample of 21 high-income countries the positive relation between informal economy and tax rates dominates. Third, a model of the informal economy for high-income countries may prove useful for policy making as informality poses an obstacle to governments' ability to increase tax revenues. As recently pointed out by The Economist [2010] many governments, in particular in Southern European countries are struggling to increase their tax revenues in the aftermath of the current economic crisis and find informality to pose an obstacle to this end.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model in greater detail. I then describe my calibration strategy. Section 4 presents the results of the paper. In Section 5 I perform a policy experiment, and Section 6 concludes.
11 The initially positive relationship loses any significance when excluding Greece from the sample of 21 high-income OECD countries.
12 The relationship remains significant for (i) start up costs and the number of registered firms and (ii) start up costs and tax evasion. While the former is not a clear measure of informality but could be driven by other factors that determine average firm size, the latter only includes tax evasion by registered firms. Thus neither suggests any causal relationship between start-up costs and informality for countries of similar income.
The Model
The set-up follows Lucas' [1978] span-of-control model. There is a single representative household and a government in this economy. The household is made up of a continuum of members with different managerial abilities.
13 According to their managerial abilities, household members either become workers or entrepreneurs. Given incomes of all household members, the household decides jointly about consumption and savings. Entrepreneurs produce a homogenous good by using labor, capital, and their ability as inputs. They also decide about the extent of informality of their business, i.e. how much of their production to declare as formal and to report for tax purposes and how much to keep informal and hidden. In the spirit of Allingham and Sandmo [1972] , hiding income from informal economic activities carries a risk of getting caught, taxed, and fined by the government.
14 The larger their firm and the larger the fraction of undeclared income, the greater is the risk faced by entrepreneurs. This modeling choice is in line with the existence of so called Large Taxpayer Units (LTUs) that particularly control large taxpayers' compliance with tax regulations in all 21 high-income countries considered, except for Switzerland (Baer [2002] ).
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Household The household is composed of a continuum of members. Its total size is normalized to unity. The household lives forever and maximizes the infinite sum of discounted utilities given by
where C t denotes total household consumption at time t, and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
Endowments Each household member has one unit of productive time that he supplies inelastically. Household members differ in their managerial abilities (z). For each individual this ability is time invariant. It is distributed in Z = [0, z] with cdf F (z) and density
13 By assuming a single representative household I abstain completely from any effects of occupational choice on the distribution of income, but focus on the effects on firm set-ups and firms' evasion decisions instead.
14 Allingham and Sandmo [1972] do not consider informality but income tax evasion and different from this paper their probability of detection for tax evaders depends negatively on the absolute amount of income declared.
15 This modeling approach is also similar to Fortin et al [1997] who assume costs of evading taxes and regulations to increase with firm size. 8 working papers series f (z). The household assigns occupations to its members depending on their abilities. They can become workers or entrepreneurs.
Production All entrepreneurs have access to the same technology. They hire workers, rent capital, and produce a single output used for consumption and investment, according to
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the span-of-control parameter and νγ ∈ (0, 1) is the capital share of production. The scale of production is increasing in the entrepreneur's ability, z.
Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs decide how much income from production to declare to the tax authorities. Their hidden income goes untaxed, but they face a risk of getting caught by the government. If entrepreneurs are caught cheating on taxes, their hidden income is taxed and they have to pay a fine M . In case their profits are too low to cover the fine, the government seizes all profits. Let p(z, x) denote the probability of getting caught for an entrepreneur of ability z hiding a fraction x of his income. I assume that this probability increases with both, the hidden fraction as well as with the scale of production or firm size. 16 In particular, p(z, x) is given by
(2.3) Figure 2 .1 shows the function p(z, x), for a specific value of θ and various levels of x.
17
For any x ∈ [0, 1], the function p(z, x) is bounded above at one. An individual of ability z who decides to hide all his income (x = 1), faces the highest probability of getting caught among all individuals of the same ability. By choosing to declare some strictly positive income (x < 1), he can effectively lower his probability of detection. On the other hand, for any value of x the probability of detection is increasing in z. Two individuals with different managerial abilities (z 1 > z 2 ), who decide to conceal the same fraction of income (x 1 = x 2 =x) will face different probabilities of detection. In particular, individual z 1 with higher managerial ability (a larger firm) will face a higher probability of detection than individual z 2 who runs an operation of smaller scale, i.e. p(z 1 ,x) > p(z 2 ,x). For any given x and z, the probability of getting caught evading taxes, p(z, x) is decreasing 16 Note that there is a one-to-one mapping between labor demand and managerial ability z, since n(z, R t , w t ) = zΥR −νγ 1−γ w νγ−1 1−γ , where Υ is a constant. A similar relationship holds for the demand of capital. Making detection depend on n or k directly would distort input choices, which is not the primary interest of the current paper.
17 Note that p(0, x) > 0 for any value of θ. However, for large values of θ (which is the case in the current calibration, see Section 3) p(0, x) is very close to 0. in θ, i.e. a higher θ is associated to a lower probability of getting caught.
Entrepreneurs choose optimal amounts of labor and capital, and the optimal fraction of undeclared income in order to maximize their profits. Given a wage rate (w t ) and a rental rate for capital (R t ), their problem is max {nt,kt,x}
where π t are before-tax profits given by
Higher wages (w t ) and rental rates (R t ) reduce entrepreneurs' profits, as does a larger spanof-control parameter (γ). 18 Higher managerial ability (z), on the other hand, increases profits of the entrepreneur. Combining the first order conditions for labor and capital, the optimal capital-labor ratio is given by,
which is independent of the tax rate (τ ) and the fraction of undeclared income (x).
19 The optimal fraction of income concealed is restricted to be at most equal to unity and is 18 As long as workers or capital owners do not know which firms evade how much of their taxes they cannot charge higher wages or higher rental rates of capital to firms cheating more on taxes than others.
19 In contrast to Guner et al [2008] and Restuccia and Rogerson [2008] who consider how policies distort input decisions, this paper looks at firm specific decisions regarding the extent of informality of their operations, given a common tax policy.
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Expected optimal profits of entrepreneurs are thus given by
Given the functional form of π e t (z, x(z), ; ), there exists a unique threshold z , where the wage rate (w t ) coincides with the expected optimal profits of the marginal entrepreneur (π e t (z , x; )). Household members with managerial ability below z will become workers. Those with abilities z > z will become entrepreneurs. 2 also depicts the relationship between the entrepreneur's ability (z) and the optimal fraction of income concealed x(z), which is clearly decreasing. Entrepreneurs of low ability who run smaller firms face a low probability of getting caught and their expected profits almost coincide with their concealed income, which makes it optimal for them to declare zero profits and to hide all their production. For entrepreneurs of higher ability z, on the other hand the probability of getting caught increases and it is optimal to declare some income. Hence, x(z) falls as z increases. Subsequently, for very talented entrepreneurs who run very large operations, p(z, x) → 1 for any x < 1, and they thus 11 working papers series declare all of their profits to the tax authorities.
The optimal fraction of income concealed x(z), thus depends crucially on the entrepreneur's ability z. It also depends critically on tax rates, τ .
Lemma 2.1. Given any probability function of getting caught evading taxes, p(z, x), that depends on z and x only, the optimal fraction of income concealed is increasing in the tax rate (τ ).
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The Household's problem The household chooses sequences of consumption and savings, and the optimal occupation for each household member. Formally the household chooses {C t , K t+1 , I z<z , I z ≤z≤z } in order to maximize Equation 2.1 subject to
where I z<z and I z ≤z≤z are indicator functions. The solution to the household's problem is characterized by the following first order conditions
(2.8) and
Condition (2.8) is the standard Euler equation for optimal capital accumulation. Condition (2.9) is similar to Lucas' [1978] condition for the 'marginal' entrepreneur. A household member with managerial ability z is indifferent between working or setting up a firm. His wage has to equal the profits he expects to make as an entrepreneur.
Government The government in this economy collects taxes on declared profits and on undeclared profits from those firms that are caught. In addition it collects the fines from these same firms. In case firms are unable to pay the fine the government seizes all their profits. Government revenues are used for pure government consumption only. Each
We can now define a competitive equilibrium for the model economy. Given a government policy {τ, M, p(z, x)} and a sequence of prices for labor and capital {w t , R t } ∞ 0 , a competitive equilibrium is a collection of sequences {C t , K t+1 , G t , z , {x(z)} z≥z } ∞ 0 such that: Absent any exogenous growth, there will be a steady state with all variables remaining constant.
Two factors, tax rates and the quality of institutions, are clearly related to the size of the informal economy across high-income countries (see Figures 1.2 and 1.3). These factors also play a key role in the model. The purpose of this paper is to assess the quantitative importance of these driving forces behind the informal economy across highincome countries. In particular I would like to answer questions like: "How much of the variation in informality across high-income countries is due to different tax rates?" "Can different tax rates and differences in governance quality fully account for differences in the informal economy across high-income countries?" The following sections undertake the quantitative analysis needed in order to address these questions.
Calibration Strategy
Some parameters of the model are fixed a priori based on available evidence. I calibrate the model's remaining parameters by matching key statistics (size of the informal economy, average firm size, employment and establishment shares of firms with less than ten employees, capital-output ratio, capital share, and the surcharge on tax evaded) for a fictitious representative country that best represents the unweighted average of 21 highincome countries in my sample.
The tax rate (τ ) in the model is fixed, based on available data. Entrepreneurs' profits are subject to income tax and only incorporated companies are subject to corporate taxes. 22 Data for this measure is available for all 21 countries and includes income tax, employee and employer social security contributions less cash benefits, applicable to a single individual without children and earnings equal to that of the average production worker. For the countries considered, between 40 − 60% of all tax revenues stem from income taxes and social security contributions.
14 working papers series considered was 38.2%.
23 For the annual depreciation rate of capital (δ) I pick the standard value of 0.048, as in Cooley and Prescott [1995] .
Next, I choose the technology parameters, the span-of-control-parameter (γ) and the share of capital (ν) and I pick the fine for tax evasion (M ), the parameter for the probability function of getting caught (θ), and the discount factor (β). I also specify the distribution of managerial ability F (z). I assume that F (z) is log-normally distributed with mean (µ) and standard deviation (σ).
24 These seven parameters are determined by matching seven targets: size of the informal economy, average firm size, employment and establishment shares of firms with less than ten employees, capital-output ratio, capital share, and the surcharge on tax evaded for the representative economy. Even though in a general equilibrium model all parameters affect all targets, I discuss briefly the data moments that each parameter is most likely to determine. According to the European Commission [2003] average firm size across all 21 countries is 7.2 workers per firm, excluding public enterprises and establishments in agriculture, fishing, forestry and hunting. I set the span-of-control parameter in the production function (γ) to 0.6897 to match this statistic. Note that this number for average firm size is relatively small, given that it includes self-employed without employees. An alternative approach would 23 The positive relationship between tax rates and the informal economy across high-income countries is robust over time and also to alternative measures of tax burden by Nickell and Nunziata [2001] . Tax data used in Figure 1 .2 is for 1996 and from Schneider [2002] and combines 'tax wedge' and value-added tax. Since the positive relationship between tax rates and informal economy is robust to the exclusion of value-added tax and as avoiding payments of value-added-tax requires networks of informal firms as in de Paula and Scheinkman [2006] , in the current exercise I chose to leave aside value-added tax rates.
24 Assuming that these parameters are the same for all countries allows me to focus on cross-country differences in policy (tax rates and governance quality).
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working papers series be to exclude these firms and to calibrate the model to an average firm size of around 13 (see pg. 25, European Commission [2003] ), leading to a larger estimate for the spanof-control parameter (γ). Everything else equal this would reduce informality and thus to match the calibration target of the informal economy (16.7%) the parameter for the probability function of getting caught would have to be adjusted. Hence, this alternative approach would simply rescale results but would not affect the relative importance of tax rates and governance quality for informality. On the other hand, a measure of informality in a model that does not include self-employed without employees would be inconsistent with Schneider [2002] 's estimates of the informal economy. Given the lack of separate estimates of informality for establishments without employees and those with employees, I prefer to use as a calibration target average firm size including self-employed without employees. Employment and establishment shares of firms are closely linked to the distribution of managerial ability. Across 21 high-income countries, 37.1% of all workers are employed by firms that have 0 to 9 employees (micro firms). These firms make up 91% of all establishments (European Commission [2003] ). In order to match employment and establishment shares of micro firms I choose the mean log-managerial ability (µ) to be 0 and set the standard deviation of log-managerial ability (σ) to 2.159. The discount factor (β) is set to 0.9307 to match an average capital-output ratio of 2.64 (Maddison [1995] and Cooley and Prescott [1995] ). 26 In the model, γν is the share of 25 This simple functional form for the distribution of managerial ability has the shortcoming that one has difficulties matching employment shares and establishment shares simultaneously. This can be achieved by assuming an extra tail for very talented managers as in Guner et al [2008] . However, as the focus of this paper is on the evasion decision of all firms rather than on the exact firm size distribution, I decided to not add two additional parameters but stick to a simple log-normal distribution for managerial ability. An alternative approach for calibrating µ and σ that uses data on observed wages as in Chang [2000] requires heterogenous wage payments across workers.
26 Data for capital-output ratios is not available for all 21 countries, that is why I consider the average over data for the US (Cooley and Prescott [1995] ), France, and Germany (Maddison [1995] ).
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working papers series capital income. Given γ, the parameter ν is set to 0.4683, to be able to generate a capital share adjusted for incomes of self-employed individuals of 0.323 (Gollin [2002] ).
27 I set θ to 77.2 to match that 16.7% of GDP is produced informally across 21 high-income OECD countries (Schneider [2002] ). Next, I determine the fine for tax evasion (M ). According to standard procedures, if firms are found to evade taxes deliberately, they have to pay their tax debt and are fined in addition. Fines across the 21 countries considered range from surcharge on taxes evaded, to surcharge on undeclared income, to fixed fines, or even imprisonment.
28 The most commonly imposed fine among the countries considered is a surcharge on taxes evaded.
29 I fix the fine for deliberate tax evasion (M ) to a value of 5.2 to match an average surcharge on tax payable of 136%.
30 Table 3 .2 summarizes all parameter values.
Results
Given parameter values of Table 3 .2, I simulate the model with i) different tax rates, ii) different governance qualities (probabilities of getting caught), and iii) different tax rates and governance qualities to generate cross-country differences in informal economy. If the model's estimates of informality fit the data well, data and model points should line up on a 45 o line. Hence, as an overall measure of how well the model fits the data, the concordance correlation coefficient seems adequate because it measures the agreement between paired readings, i.e. model and data points. The concordance correlation coefficient is defined as ρ c = 2ρσ x σ y σ 2 x + σ 2 y + (µ x − µ y ) 2 , where µ x is the mean of informality in the data and µ y the mean of informality in the model, σ 2 x and σ 2 y are the respective variances and ρ is the correlation between informal economy estimates in model and data. The concordance correlation coefficient has various advantage over alternative measures. In comparison to a simple correlation, it also takes into account how well the model does in terms of replicating mean and variance of the data. On the other hand when using paired t-tests or least square analysis, very small 27 This adjustment makes capital and labor shares relatively constant across countries. However, numbers for adjusted labor shares are only available for 12 of the 21 countries.
28 See OECD's Centre for Tax Policy Administration [2006] for a detailed description on tax administration procedures in OECD countries, including fines imposed for deliberate tax evasion. 29 In this model imposing a surcharge on tax evaded instead of a fixed fine would make tax evasion independent of the tax rate and a function of the surcharge rate only.
30 Let s be the surcharge on tax payable, τ π * . Then fixing M , tax rate, and average before-tax profits of managers who evade taxes in the representative (average) country, one obtains the value for s = 
Model with differences in tax rates 45º
Tax Rates and the Informal Economy Figure 4 .1 displays the relation between informal economy estimates by Schneider [2002] and those produced by the model when only differences in tax rates are taken into account (Model 1). For Canada, Denmark and Finland estimates of informality by Model 1 are close to the data (see column 2 of Table 4 .1). This result suggests that for these three countries tax rates differences with respect to the average can account for relative differences in informality. For Austria, Switzerland, and the US, informality is overestimated, while in particular for Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, Model 1 underestimates the informal economy. For most countries, differences in tax rates alone cannot account for informality. Model 1 produces too little variation in informality, its standard deviation (STD) being equal to just 28% of the standard deviation in the data. The concordance correlation coefficient (Concordance Correl) for Model 1 is equal to 0.23, suggesting that a model with tax rates as the only source of heterogeneity among countries can only account for approximately 23% of informality across high-income countries. Hence, in order to better account for the informal economy across high-income countries, differences in governance quality, the extent to which these tax rates are enforced, have to be taken into account.
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Governance and the Informal Economy Governance quality means good institutions and a high quality government that indicate that a country is coherently enforcing its policies and that tax evaders are caught with a high probability. Corruption on the other hand poses an obstacle to the enforcement of policies. Within the model, the parameter θ, governing the probability of getting caught producing informally can be interpreted as a measure of the quality of governance. I take the calibrated value for θ and search for a simple mapping from the average value for the Control of Corruption Index (I cc ), into the calibrated value for θ. In particular, I set θ = a Icc
, where a is a constant. 32 Then I apply the same linear mapping to the Control of Corruption Indices for all countries to obtain a transformed index of governance quality θ i , suitable for the model. Given the simple linear transformation, these values are given by Model with differences in governance Figure 4 .2 shows the relation between informal economy estimates by Schneider [2002] and those produced by the model specification that keeps tax rates fixed at the average 32 Higher values of any of the Governance Indices indicate better governance. However, in the model a larger value for θ is associated to worse governance , i.e. a lower probability of getting caught. Hence, I use the inverse of the indices to calculate the respective values for θ. With I cc being equal to 1.74 (for 2000) and the calibrated value for θ being 77.2, the constant a is equal to 121.7.
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working papers series level and only varies θ i across countries (Model 2). Column 3 of Table 4 .1 reports the values for the informal economy produced by Model 2. Most countries' informal economy estimates by Model 2 are on average closer to the data than those produced by Model 1, reducing the mean absolute error by 5%. Model 2 produces a variation in informality similar to the one in the data. Standard deviations are 0.053 in the model and 0.055 in the data.
The concordance correlation coefficient for model 2 indicates that 65% of informality across high-income countries is accounted for by a model in which differences in governance quality are the only source of heterogeneity among countries. Across high-income countries, differences in the quality of governance seem to play a more important role for explaining the variation in informality. However, for Canada, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, Norway, and Sweden estimates of the informal economy produced by Model 2 are lower than the data and worse than those produced by Model 1. On the other hand, for countries like Japan and Ireland estimates produced by Model 2 are too high. This suggests that to account for some countries' informality, relative differences in tax rates with respect to the average country seem to be more important than relative differences in governance quality.
Tax Rates, Governance, and the Informal Economy When combining both, differences in tax rates and differences in governance quality (Model 3) the model's explanatory power is further increased (see Figure 4. 3). Model 3 -the model with differences in tax rates and differences in governance quality -provides the best overall picture of the informal economy in high-income countries, though estimates of informality for countries with very good governance and high tax rates as Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Canada continue to be too low.
Column 4 of Table 4 .1 shows that the third specification of the model can account for approximately 72% of informality across high-income countries. Its standard deviation is equal to the one in the data. Model 3 has the lowest mean absolute error, 10% lower than Model 1 and 5% lower than Model 2. On average, estimates of the informal economy by model 3 are in a range of +/ − 3% compared to values in the data. Agents facing high tax rates have a strong incentive to evade taxes. However, they will also take into account their country's enforcement of tax policy. If a country closely monitors its tax payers and controls their compliance with tax laws regularly, agents will prefer to pay most of their taxes upfront instead of later and together with a fine. Strictly enforcing its tax policy a country can counteract the positive effect of high tax rates on informality. 21 working papers series In addition, the model with differences in tax rates and governance quality preserves the positive relationship between tax rates and the informal economy, as well as the negative relation between informal economy and governance quality (see Figure 4 .4).
Robustness Check I check the robustness of the model's results along various dimensions. 33 The model's results turn out to be robust to the choice of the measure of governance quality. I simulate the model with differences in tax rates and differences in governance quality using as alternative measures of governance quality the World Bank Governance Indicators on Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, and Rule of Law as well as Transparency International's anti-corruption index. In all cases, the concordance correlation coefficient of variation for model 3 (Tax+Gov.) is larger than the one for model 2 (Gov. only), which in turn is larger than the one for model 1 (Tax only). In terms of the relative importance of differences in governance quality compared to tax rates the model's results are also robust to the exclusion of Greece and Italy, the two countries with the largest informal economy among the 21 countries considered. To this end, the model's parameters are calibrated to a mean of 19 countries, excluding Italy and Greece. While the overall explanatory power of both tax rates and governance quality for informality across countries is lowered, together both factors continue to explain around 40% of informality across high-income countries. I also consider a completely different alterna- Control of Corruption Index Informal Economy (Schneider, 2002) tive calibration strategy that uses data from one particular country to set parameters and calibration targets. 34 The importance of differences in governance quality compared to differences in tax rates also holds under this alternative calibration and the model is able to account for 55% of informality across high-income countries. However, a model calibrated to data from a single country has difficulties matching average informality across all 21 countries.
Policy Experiment -Reducing Informality
What is the most effective way to lower informality? The answer to this question might be of interest to policy makers in many high-income countries, since informality raises concerns about fair and equal treatment of taxpayers and also limits the possibilities of 34 See Tables F-6 and F-7 of Appendix F for details on this alternative calibration.
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working papers series tax collection.
35 Figure 5 .5 shows tax revenues as a function of tax rates for the Benchmark representative country ('Mean enforcement') and a second 'fictitious' country where agents do not have the option to hide any production from the authorities ('Perfect enforcement'). In the presence of informality it is more difficult for policy makers to obtain 
Tax Revenues
Mean enforcement Perfect Enforcement Figure 5 .5: Effects of Informality on Tax Revenues a certain amount of tax revenues. For tax rates between 10% and 50% a government with an imperfect (mean) enforcement technology collects 5% less tax revenues than a government with a perfect enforcement technology.
36
In the current model, if a country wants to reduce its informal economic activity, it can opt for three strategies: increasing fines, reducing tax rates, or increasing enforcement. Figure 5 .6 shows the effectiveness of these three strategies. 37 Reducing informality by increasing the fine for evading taxes is a costless policy measure but has strong limitations -see Graph (1) of Figure 5 .6. For the case of the representative country, even increasing the fine by almost 20 times, reduces informality by just 0.5 percentage points. Equally, lowering the fine by around 50%, leads to a mere increase in informal economy by less than one percentage point. Hence, informality is rather inelastic with respect to fines. Firms 35 A third reason why policy makers might want to formalize economic activity is linked to external observability. Financial market ratings of national debt are closely linked to a country's performance of its 'formal' GDP and its tax base. A large informal sector reduces both and might thus make issuing debt more expensive.
36 Only at very high tax rates of more than 75% are tax revenues under imperfect enforcement higher than under perfect enforcement given that in the latter case the Laffer curve effect kicks in earlier.
37 For calculating each graph, I used Benchmark parameters of Table 3 .2 and only varied the relevant parameters.
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working papers series evading taxes cannot be fined more than their one period profits. Thus, fines only affect the first term of firms' expected profits (see Equation 2.4), which puts an upper bound to the fine, limiting its effectiveness for lowering informality. Increasing fines infinitely high in order to achieve some reduction in informality would seem like a straight forward policy recommendation. However, the recommendation while useful in the context of this model has to be taken with care when put to practice. A reduction in the total number of firms might be an unintended consequence of this policy, because charging firms their total period's profits may affect their ability to start up a new firm in the following period. Graph (2) of Figure 5 .6 shows the effectiveness of reducing tax rates in order to limit informality. Given mean enforcement standards, lowering tax rates from an initial 38.2% by 18 percentage points to 20% reduces informality by less than 3 percentage points, from, 16.7% to 13.7%. In addition, reducing tax rates is a costly measure given forgone tax revenues. Finally, countries can reduce informality by improving their governance quality and increasing the enforcement of their tax laws (Graph (3) of Figure 5 .6). 38 Increasing 38 The United Nations [2006] recommend that "serious considerations should be given to developing 25 working enforcement seems to be the most effective way to reduce informality. The elasticity of informality with respect to enforcement is higher than elasticities of informality with respect to fines or tax rates. Given an average tax rate of 38.2% and a value for θ of 77.2, increasing enforcement by 50% (i.e. lowering θ by 50%) leads to a reduction in informality by almost 10 percentage points from 16.7% to around 7.5%.
Benefits and Costs of Improved Tax Enforcement
Given that the size of the informal economy is quite sensitive to the intensity of tax enforcement, a natural question to ask is how much countries can reduce their informal economy by improving the enforcement of their tax laws. Especially for countries like Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal that are currently facing serious fiscal constraints and are struggling to increase tax revenues, improving tax enforcement is crucial. According to the Control of Corruption Index, Finland has the best governance quality (enforcement technology). It ranks second according to the Rule of Law Index and the Regulatory Quality Index, and fourth according to the Government Effectiveness Index. What if Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal had Finland's governance quality? Table 5 .2 shows how these countries adapting Finland's standards of enforcement can reduce their informality by between 19.4 percentage points in Greece and 7.9 percentage points in Spain, requiring an increase in their enforcement by 70.7% and 39.7% respectively. 39 In particular, better enforcement does not only reduces informality it also leads to higher tax revenues. Increases in tax revenues range from 17.4% in Greece to 7.0% in Spain. the institutional capacities necessary for gradually formalizing informal economies."(pg.13).
39 As a larger value of θ is associated to worse governance -a lower probability of getting caught, increases in enforcement are equivalent to reductions in θ. Hence, Table 5 .2 reports absolute increases in θ -|∆θ i |.
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While countries can thus reduce their informality and achieve higher tax revenues by adopting Finland's enforcement standards, increasing enforcement, however, is costly. In order to evaluate the policy of increasing enforcement standards to Finish levels and to be able to compare it to the alternative policy of lowering tax rates, we would like to have an estimate for the costs of enforcement. The OECD's Centre for Tax Policy Administration [2006] provides information on costs of revenue collection as a fraction of tax revenues, the fraction of wage costs in revenue collection costs, and the proportion of staff assigned to enforcement related tasks.
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In order to calculate an estimate of enforcement costs for country i, let C i be the costs of collecting taxes per 100 units of tax revenues, c wi the fraction of wage costs, and S i the proportion of staff assigned to enforcement related tasks (audit, investigation and other verification functions and enforced debt collection and related functions). Then I define C e i = C i c wi S i as enforcement costs per 100 units of tax revenues and thus assume that enforcement costs consist of the total wage bill associated with enforcements tasks while all other remaining costs are assumed to be independent of enforcement.
41 Let (1 + |∆θ i |) and (1+∆T i ) be absolute increases in enforcement and tax revenues associated to adopting Finish enforcement standards in country i respectively (see Table 5 .2). I simply assume that
i.e. enforcements costs increase by the percentage increase in required enforcement per extra unit of tax revenues.
Given the cost function above, increases in total costs; i.e. increased enforcement costs plus those costs that remain constant (salaries associated to tasks other than enforcement and administrative costs) can be estimated the following way Finish standards tend to face a higher increase in costs (∆C i ). However, given the heterogeneity in enforcement costs this relationship is not proportional. Portugal and Spain both face an increase in tax collection costs of 7.6% and 7.2% respectively. However, while these costs are associated to a reduction in informality by 10.3 percentage points and an increase in tax revenues by 9% in Portugal, in Spain numbers are 7.9 percentage points and 7% respectively. This difference is due to the fact that in Spain a larger fraction of tax administration staff is assigned to enforcement tasks. On average, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal would need to expand their tax administration's budget by approximately 9% in order to carry out the policy of adopting Finland's standards of enforcement. In order to provide a notion for the benefits of this policy, Table 5 .3 also shows the percentage increase in tax collection costs that would leave each country indifferent in terms of tax revenues net of tax administration costs (∆C M AXi ). Total tax administration costs would have to increase by more than 5 times for the policy to not be self financing. Thus, potential benefits of increasing enforcement standards to the Finish level are large. Not only will informality be reduced but most likely tax revenues will be higher even after taking into account the increase in enforcement cost.
Conclusion
The informal economy in high-income countries is large and mainly linked to tax evasion. Whereas, most models of the informal economy focus on developing countries where informality is linked to issues such as dual labor markets for productive (formal) and less productive (informal) workers, limited access to credit, and fixed costs of setting up a business, this paper provides a model for the informal economy in high-income countries where 28 working entrepreneurs across all sectors and firm sizes decide to hide part of their income from tax authorities. Among high-income countries, there is a positive relation between tax rates and and size of the informal economy and a negative relationship between informal economy and various indices of governance quality. These two relationships constitute the building blocks for the model of this paper. A calibrated version of the model quantifies the influence of tax rates and governance quality on informality. It shows that differences in tax rates alone can only account for approximately 23% of informality across highincome countries, while differences in governance quality, the extent to which these tax rates are enforced, can account for about 65%. When combining both, differences in tax rates and differences in governance quality, the model accounts for 72% of informality across high-income countries.
Among the three ways to reduce informality -higher fines, lower tax rates, stronger enforcement -the latter is found to be the most effective. If countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain were to adopt Finland's level of enforcement, their average informality would drop by around 13 percentage points and their tax revenues would increase by an average 12%. Average costs of this policy are found to be equivalent to at most 9% of the average tax administration's budget, one fifth of the average increase in tax revenues net of costs associated to the reduction in informality. These results suggest that policy makers who are struggling to increase tax revenues in the aftermaths of the current economic crisis (see The Economist [2010] ) should seriously consider increasing the enforcement of their existing tax rates.
In the simple model of informality presented in this paper, government authorities act myopically and purely mechanically, applying the same fine with the same probability to firms evading taxes once or 100 times. In order to model tax authorities' actions more realistically, one might want to consider a framework that incorporates fines for tax evasion or the probability of being caught depending on an individual's history of tax evasion. This extension would introduce an additional heterogeneity that varied along time and so would individuals' occupational choices, i.e. firms' entry and exit decisions. While it is not clear how much this alternative framework will alter the quantitative results of the current paper, it seems particularly interesting for the study of the interplay between tax evasion and entry and exit of firms, which I consider to be an interesting road for future research. The currency demand method used by Schneider [2002] to obtain estimates of the informal economy for the 21 high-income countries considered in this paper is just one of many ways to try to measure something not measured by statistical offices and government institutions. The transactions approach developed by Feige [1981] is similar to the currency demand method. It estimates the income which should have been produced by all non-financial transactions and compares it to the observed income in an economy. The difference is thought to have been generated by the informal sector. Other methods apply surveys, discrepancies between expenditure and income, or differences between official and actual labor force participation rate to estimate the size of the informal economy. To estimate the informal economy for other countries, Schneider uses the so-called DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-causes) model that incorporates multiple causes of informality into the estimation. A detailed description of this method can be found in Aigner et al[1988] . Friedman et al [2000] use estimates of the informal economy obtained by the so called physical input or electricity method. Schneider and Enste [2000] provide an overview of all of these methods. There is no overall accepted method and all are criticized for various reasons (see Thomas [1999] 
B Income Data
E Robustness Check
Measure of Governance Quality When using as alternative measure of governance quality the Rule of Law Index, statistics are better than for the Benchmark case that uses the Control of Corruption Index. However, as the Rule of Law Index includes answers to specific questions about tax evasion, I decided against its use for the Benchmark estimation despite its better quantitative performance in order to avoid problems of endogeneity which may arise if surveyed individuals take into account the same estimates of informality used in this paper. 
F Alternative Calibration
In this alternative calibration to data of a single country, France is chosen as a representative country because its average firm size, informal economy, and employment and establishment shares of firms with less than ten employees are closest to the mean values of these four variables across all 21 high-income countries. 
